Resilience and Water Governance:
Addressing Fragmentation and
Uncertainty in Water Allocation
and Water Quality Law by Cosens, Barbara A. & Stow, Craig A.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Publications, Agencies and Staff of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce U.S. Department of Commerce 
2014 
Resilience and Water Governance: Addressing Fragmentation and 
Uncertainty in Water Allocation and Water Quality Law 
Barbara A. Cosens 
University of Idaho 
Craig A. Stow 
NOAA Great Lakes Environmental Research Laboratory, craig.stow@noaa.gov 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usdeptcommercepub 
Cosens, Barbara A. and Stow, Craig A., "Resilience and Water Governance: Addressing Fragmentation and 
Uncertainty in Water Allocation and Water Quality Law" (2014). Publications, Agencies and Staff of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce. 522. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usdeptcommercepub/522 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Department of Commerce at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Publications, Agencies 
and Staff of the U.S. Department of Commerce by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Resilience and Water Governance: 
Addressing Fragmentation and 
Uncertainty in Water Allocation 
and Water Quality Law 
 
 
Barbara A. Cosens.  
College of Law, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho 
 
Craig A. Stow 





Published in Social-Ecological Resilience and Law, ed. Ahjond S. 
Garmestani and Craig R. Allen (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2014). 
 
This article/chapter is a U.S. government work and is not subject to 




Resilience and Water Governance 
Addressing Fragmentation and Uncertainty in Water 
Allocation and Water Quality Law 
BARBARA A. COSENS AND CRAIG A. STOW 
The U.S. EPA reports that almost half of the nation's rivers and two-
thirds of its lakes are use-impaired due to poor water quality (U.S. 
EPA 1998, 2002, 2010; Houck 2002). The Western Water Policy Review 
Advisory Commission identified both poor water quality and unhealthy 
aquatic systems among the water challenges facing the West (Western 
Water Policy Review Advisory Commission 1998). The water quality 
impairment is caused both by chemical pollution and physical altera-
tion of streams. Nutrients and excess sediment impair water quality in 
30 percent of the nation's streams (U.S. EPA 2011). In the Great Basin 
nearly two-thirds of the native fish are either listed under the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA) or considered of concern by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (USFWS). Water development is considered second 
only to the introduction of nonnative fish in causing these problems 
(Doremus 2001). 
In 1906, Justice Holmes, writing for a majority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in an opinion that denied an injunction against the disposal of 
Chicago's sewage into the Missouri River, stated, "It is a question of the 
first magnitude whether the destiny of the great rivers is to be the sew-
ers of the cities along their banks or to be protected against everything 
which threatens their purity;' thus requiring clear proof of the source 
of serious harm if the court is to act in the absence of Congressional 
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legislation (Missouri v. Illinois 1906). It would be sixty-six years before 
Congress would act. 
By many accounts, the efforts under the 1972 Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), to 
clean up point source discharges from municipal sewage and industrial 
activities under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
program have been successful (e.g., Houck 2002; Adler et al. 1993). Sim-
ilarly, by all accounts and relying on the statistics above, it is also clear 
that the cleanup of non-point source pollution is insufficient to achieve 
the goal of the CW A to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical 
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters" (CWA § 1251(a)). Diffuse 
sources of pollution resulting from land use activities, including agri-
culture, timber harvest, and development in the floodplain; dewatering 
of streams for beneficial use of water; and loss of the ability of streams 
to handle sediment input due to modification of floodplains and adja-
cent wetlands, continue to present challenges to efforts to achieve water 
quality standards. It is not that the CWA does not address non-point 
source issues. Whether due to the inadequacy of the approach or of its 
implementation, it has not yielded the results sought of fishable, swim-
mable rivers. 
A report of the National Research Council (NRC) to Congress in 2001 
identified uncertainty as a key barrier to management decision making 
and improved water quality under the CW A and recommended that the 
states and EPA move forward with management actions "while making 
substantial efforts to reduce uncertainty" (NRC 2001). Further, the NRC 
specifically recommended against the practice of measuring the success 
of the program to address non-point source pollution (also referred to 
as the total maximum daily load [TMDL] program) by the attainment of 
administrative goals, but rather by measurable improvements in water 
quality. In addition, the NRC report and a report of an expert panel, 
including coauthor Stow, assembled by the Center for the Analysis and 
Prediction of River Basin Environmental Systems at Duke University, 
recommended the use of adaptive implementation to address uncer-
tainty (NRC 2001; Shabman et al. 2007). 
In this chapter, we identify two areas that must be addressed in 
reforming water law and water quality law if the nation's stated goals 
are to be achieved: 
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(1) Fragmentation. Lack of integration between regulation of point 
source and non-point source pollution, non-point source pollution 
and land use regulation, and water quality and water allocation regula-
tion not only places an absolute limit on the ability of current regulation 
to achieve its goals, but imposes high costs and diminishing returns on 
any efforts toward those goals under existing regulation. 
(2) Uncertainty. The diversity of both the physical and biological fea-
tures of water bodies and of the sources of non-point source pollu-
tion require site-specific responses. Yet the cost of characterizing water 
quality on a water body by water body basis and the failure to follow up 
on efforts to achieve water quality standards with monitoring of results 
inhibits improvements in water quality characterization and identifica-
tion of land use changes that are effective in moving toward water qual-
ity goals. In contrast to the early expectations of a fairly straightforward 
calculation of pollutant loads (Houck 2002), studies have shown that 
even modeling of relatively data-rich systems shows variance in excess 
of 50 percent (Stow et al. 2003). 
Integration of water resource management and adaptation in the 
face of uncertainty require new approaches to natural resource man-
agement and regulation. Resilience theory provides a foundation for 
relating these changes to the complexity of the social-ecological system 
and for the necessary communication across disciplines to define those 
changes. Resilience theory as applied to ecological systems addresses a 
system's ability to respond to change w,hile continuing to provide, or to 
shift to a state in which it will provide, a full range of ecosystem services 
or function (Walker and Salt 2006). On paper, the traditional approach 
to natural resource management involving single-variable optimization 
can be implemented by individual resource management or regulatory 
agencies acting at a single scale. But the complexity of social-ecological 
systems will lead to unexpected and unwanted results if management 
and regulation continue down that path. 
The concept of resilience made its appearance in the study of ecologi-
cal systems in the work of C. S. Holling (1973) and his recognition that 
ecosystems are not static. When applied to ecological systems without a 
human component, resilience theory focuses on both the capacity of the 
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system to return to its prior level of self-organization following a distur-
bance and the degree to which that capacity is influenced by or sensitive 
to changes at smaller and larger scales (Gunderson and Holling 2002; 
Walker et al. 2004). Resilience theorists call on adaptive management, in 
which the natural adaptive abilities of an ecosystem are emphasized and 
promoted over the active management, control, and resource exploita-
tion of the system to foster ecological resilience (Folke et al. 2005). The 
term "adaptive implementation" used by Shabman et al. (2007) incorpo-
rates the concepts of adaptive management but applies them in a setting 
in which the agency must implement a specific regulatory statute rather 
than acting under its general management authority over a particular 
resource or area of land. Both concepts allow for incremental action in 
the face of uncertainty, along with constant monitoring and feedback to 
improve management or regulatory decisions. 
We use resilience theory to explore the legal changes and implemen-
tation approaches necessary to achieve adaptive implementation of the 
CWA and integrated water resource management within the current 
U.S. framework, which places water quality oversight at the federal level, 
water allocation at the state level, and most land use decisions at the 
local level. We begin by exploring fragmentation and uncertainty issues 
in current water management and regulation. 
Water Management: Sources of Fragmentation 
and Uncertainty 
Discussion of means to address fragmentation and uncertainty in water 
management must begin with an explanation of how the current sys-
tem arose in the United States and how that leads to fragmentation and 
lack of adaptability in the face of uncertainty. History matters, because 
it informs the choice of approaches that may be politically acceptable. 
In addition, the greater the understanding of how the current system 
arose, the greater the chance of avoiding unintended consequences in 
changing it. We begin with the law applicable to water quality, follow 
this with discussions of management of aquatic species and then water 
allocation, and conclude with land use regulation. 
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Water Quality 
Historically water quality issues were considered a matter of state law. 
Dilution was the primary focus of water quality control, and a public 
nuisance suit was the primary legal remedy to the impact on down-
stream states when Justice Holmes wrote the words quoted above. 
Several events and reports spurred federal action. In January 1969 a 
Union Oil well off the coast of Santa Barbara, California, blew out. In 
June 1969 the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, burned (Adler et al. 
1993). A 1971 report titled Water Wasteland, compiled by researchers 
for Ralph Nader, detailed fish kills, water courses and beaches unfit for 
swimming, contaminated drinking water, and loss of bird species due 
to toxic chemicals in water (Adler et al. 1993). That same year, similar 
findings were presented in the Second Annual Report of the President's 
Council on Environmental Quality (Adler et al. 1993). Leaving water 
quality to the states was apparently not working. Federal action up until 
this time had focused primarily on financial assistance for sewage treat-
ment plants. 
Water quality standards under the CWA are set on a water body 
basis and are tailored to the particular use of that water body, includ-
ing recreation and habitat for endangered species (33 USC § 1313). 
Because water quality standards are based on use, it is theoretically 
those who control its use who should set those standards; at least this 
was the argument states made to Congress as the CW A was being 
crafted (Houck 2002). Governors see~ing to retain state control pro-
vided testimony to Congress that ranged from the 1970s equivalent of 
the need for local knowledge and flexibility; to the constitutionality 
of federal interference with state control of any but interstate waters, 
an argument that persists today (e.g., see Rapanos v. United States, 
2006); to claims that states were already doing a great job (Houck 
2002), an argument made despite the fact that it was inconsistent with 
the scientific data before Congress. An additional argument made was 
that a standards-based program that can take into account the indi-
vidual assimilative capacity of specific water bodies was the appropri-
ate approach (Houck 2002). As will be discussed below, despite this 
argument, states have failed to consider the assimilative capacity of 
a water body when allocating water for use. Rarely is pollutant load 
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a consideration when approving a new water diversion right, despite 
the fact that increased diversion reduces the ability of the water body 
to dilute pollutants. This might make sense in the water abundance of 
the eastern United States, but its proponents were not limited to the 
nonarid states. 
Despite the tremendous success of the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System program, the nation's waters remain polluted. 
Houck provides a list of agricultural and silviculture impacts in various 
states, then concludes that these sources: 
have several characteristics in common. Individually small, it is their 
cumulative impacts that are the problem, and we have not yet in any 
medium found an easy way to persuade people to fix problems for 
which they are only a small contributing factor. Furthermore, although 
individually small, these sources are supported by industries with a 
political lock on state legislatures and, in some cases, on Congress as 
well. (Houck 2002) 
Most effort to abate non-point source pollution has proceeded under 
the entirely voluntary provisions of section 319, which provides both 
technical assistance and grants for state management programs (33 
U.S.c. § 1329). Yet another provision holds more potential for clout-
section 303(d). 
States setting standards had been the approach of the Water Quality 
Act of 1965, which was applicable to interstate waters, but the arguments 
in favor of keeping it prevailed only for what was viewed as a backup 
provision-section 303(d), applicable only if a water body did not meet 
water quality standards with regulation of point sources. The TMDL pro-
gram under section 303(d) embodies an approach "that both the states 
and pollution dischargers insisted on" (Houck 2002). Section 303(d) was a 
provision that appeared and was treated as an afterthought in passage of 
the 1972 CWA (Houck 2002), yet it contains more clout than originally 
thought. Under section 303(d), once standards are set, TMDLs are set 
on a water body by water body basis for each pollutant found in excess 
of the applicable standard (33 U.S.c. § 1313(d); Houck 2002). Loads are 
then allocated between point and non-point sources as appropriate. 
Despite the existence of the provision in the CW A since 1972, nothing 
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happened for a decade. Because the provision was assumed not to trig-
ger EPA action until a state submitted TMDLs, states could sit back 
and do nothing (Houck 2002). A series of citizen suits in the late 1980s 
challenged this assumption and prevailed on the issue of the EPA's need 
to act if the state failed to submit TMDLs (e.g., Alaska Center of the 
Environment v. Reilly, 1991; Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reilly, 
1992); this was followed by a successful challenge to the assumption that 
a state could submit anything and get off the hook (Idaho Sportsmen's 
Coalition v. Browner 1996). Thus, the arduous process of characteriz-
ing the water quality of the nation's waters began, only to find that this 
process of characterizing the water quality of every water body within a 
state involves an enormous undertaking and is fraught with uncertainty, 
as discussed below (Shabman et al. 2007). 
Aquatic Species 
Similar to water quality regulation, take of fish and wildlife has tradi-
tionally been a matter of state concern (Goble et al. 2006), whereas the 
preservation of the habitats various species rely upon has often occurred 
at the federal level (e.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918; Land and 
Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965). With much of the funding for 
state fish and wildlife agencies coming from hunting and fishing licenses, 
state management focuses on game species and sport and commercial 
fisheries. With a few exceptions, federal land preservation rarely focused 
on biodiversity and generally preserved land already in federal owner-
ship. The primary tool for restricting development of private land, land 
use zoning, is rarely used for purposes of biodiversity protection. 
For most aquatic species and nongame species, the approach of states 
and federal land preservation once again fell short. Increasing human 
population, an even greater rate of increasing consumption, and the 
resulting loss of habitat caused the loss of "over five hundred species 
formerly found in the United States ... [with] an additional 47 percent 
of the species unique to this country" at risk (Goble et al. 2006). The Bio-
logical Resources Division of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) identi-
fies freshwater fish as the single most endangered vertebrate group in 
the United States (Doremus 2001). 
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Similar to the history of federal regulation of water quality, Congress 
stepped in to fill the gap with passage of the ESA in 1973. The ESA 
combines both time-honored approaches: restriction on take (sections 
7 and 9) and preservation of habitat (section 4) (Goble et al. 2006). For 
listings of aquatic species and designation of their critical habitat, the 
USFWS lists resident fish species and NOAA Fisheries lists ocean and 
anadromous fish species. 
The regulation of water quality and listing of aquatic species, both 
at the federal level, has led to some degree of coordination. Listed 
species must be included as one of the "uses" for which water quality 
standards are designated (CWA §§ 1251(a)(2), 1313(c)(2)(A). However, 
as described above, achieving these standards remains elusive and, as 
described below, efforts are hampered by uncertainty. 
Water Allocation 
Although the system of water allocation differs between the eastern and 
western United States, the fact that water allocation remains at the state 
level, water quality regulation at the federal level, and land use decisions 
at the local level is equally applicable. For purposes of this chapter, west-
ern water allocation can simply be considered the worst case scenario in 
terms of separation of water allocation law from other management and 
regulatory efforts aimed at the water resource. 
Western water allocation arose both as a means to manage water in 
an arid region (e.g., Stegner 1953) and to provide certainty to investment 
for extraction and development of natural resources (e.g., Irwin v. Phil-
lips 1855). In the late 1800s, John Wesley Powell recognized that rivers 
would control western development and recommended to Congress that 
the federal government draw jurisdictional boundaries along topographic 
divides (Stegner 1953; Reisner 1987). He also noted that the cost of water 
development would require formation of collectives or irrigation districts 
for the control ofland and water (Stegner 1953). Congress did not take his 
recommendations in defining political boundaries. States ignored much 
of his advice concerning shared development and shared water use. 
Under u.s. Supreme Court interpretation of federal law, water alloca-
tion and management is a matter of state law (California Oregon Power 
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Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. 1935; United States v. Rio Grande Irri-
gation Co. 1899). Without the foresight that this land would come to be 
home to a population that must share its water resources for economic 
pursuits as diverse as irrigation and fishing or the havoc that dewatering 
of streams would play on habitat, state courts sought a means of alloca-
tion that protected investment (Wilkinson 1985; Dellapenna 2000). The 
result: the doctrine of prior appropriation, followed in some form by 
most western states (Hutchins 1971). 
Under prior appropriation, the right of the earliest appropriator on a 
stream is satisfied first; junior appropriators take the remaining water. 
Shortages are not shared among appropriators. Due to the high variabil-
ity in annual water supply, the fact that the largest use, irrigation, does 
not require a constant diversion of water, and the fact that state water 
allocation criteria generally do not require consideration of in stream 
flow, state agencies generally approve water allocation permits to the 
point that all water is allocated in the wettest year. As drought becomes 
an increasingly frequent occurrence, this practice leads to dewater-
ing of many streams at certain times of the year in areas of irrigated 
agriculture. 
The allocation of appropriative water rights to individuals rather than 
geographically related communities, as recommended by Powell, also 
significantly reduced the possibility that allocation and management 
decisions would be made for the good of the community as a whole or 
for the long-term health of the riparian habitat (Tarlock 2000). Addi-
tionally, the practice inhibits any effort to adapt as new knowledge on 
the effects of diversion is gained. The relative control over water diver-
sion of the individual, as opposed to the state, is implemented for the 
most part as though diversion decisions are unrelated to water qual-
ity. States that have requirements for consideration of impact on water 
quality (e.g., Montana Code § 85-2-311(£)), generally limit it to the water 
quality required by another appropriator. Some states include criteria 
that could be interpreted more broadly to address the affect on water 
quality in general, such as Idaho's public interest criteria (Idaho Code 
§ 42-203A(5)(e)). In either case, it is an inquiry that takes place prior to 
issuing a permit to divert water and is a one-time consideration, after 
which the permit is viewed as a property right. In the two states used 
as examples, water allocation and water quality decisions are housed 
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in separate agencies; thus, imposing an additional barrier to thorough 
review of allocation decisions in light of water quality impacts. 
In addition, growing urban demand for water in the western United 
States and increasing call for dedication of water to instream flow for 
ecol_ogical purposes has run headlong into this rigid system of property 
rights. States authorize water transfers and increasingly have established 
water banks to facilitate the movement of water from one use to another 
(e.g., Dellapenna 2000). Because the voluntary nature of water transfers 
may prevent water availability for a new use, some states allow devel-
opment of the new use but require mitigation for effects on existing 
rights. Mitigation measures can be voluntarily agreed to among affected 
parties; a party could consider water quality in the mitigation process. 
However, mitigation or augmentation may also be approved by the state 
over the protest of an existing right holder. In such a case, water quality 
is not a consideration (e.g., Idaho Administrative Code § 37.03.11.043; 
Colorado Revised Statutes § 37-92-305). 
State courts considering whether the reliance of a pollutant discharge 
permit on mixing to achieve water quality standards can be grounds for 
denial of an allocation permit have characterized the issue as whether 
the discharge permit gives rise to a water right (e.g., City of Thornton 
v. Bijou Irrigation Co. 1996). This leads to the logical answer-no. In 
contrast, if water quality and water quantity are integrated, it might be 
more appropriate to ask whether the public interest requires that water 
for dilution remain in the stream, thus limiting stream allocation with 
water quality discharge in mind. 
Application of the take provisions of the ESA to reduce water diver-
sion has run headlong into the use of the system of property rights to 
allocate water in the western United States. The property right to water 
recognized in the western United States is a mere use right and thus 
differs from a property right to land, which is the right to possess and 
exclude others from the actual land. Idaho law describes the nature of 
the property right as it was understood at common law: 
All the waters of the state, when flowing in their natural channels, 
including the waters of all natural springs and lakes within the bound-
aries of the state are declared to be the property of the state ... and 
the right to the use of any of the public waters which have heretofore 
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been or may hereafter be allotted or beneficially applied, shall not 
be considered as being a property right in itself, but such right shall 
become the complement of, or one of the appurtenances of, the land 
or other thing to which, through necessity, said water is being applied. 
(Idaho Code § 42-101) 
Yet despite this very clear difference between a use right and a right 
to the actual water, recent court decisions have interpreted any dimin-
ishment in use due to application of the ESA to be a Fifth Amend-
ment Taking because the water itself is taken, rather than looking to 
the change in value of the "land or other thing to which ... [it] is 
being applied" (see Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 
2008). This view prevents any coordination between water allocation 
under existing rights and determination of flow needs under the ESA 
or water quality standards set for listed species without payment to 
the water right holder. 
Land Use 
During colonial times, land use regulation occurred at multiple lev-
els of government (e.g., Hart 1995-1996). However, since at least the 
recognition of the constitutionality of local land use zoning (Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 1926), land use decisions have been 
considered a matter of state law and are generally delegated to local 
subdivisions of the state through state constitutions or statutes (e.g., 
Heim 2005; Baker and Rodriguez 2009). In addition, a majority of 
states recognize municipal home rule by either statutes or constitu-
tions, which effectively allows a municipality to act for the health and 
welfare of its community even in the absence of state delegation, as 
long as the action does not conflict with state or federal law. Some 
states have interpreted home rule authority to allow land use zoning 
that is not consistent with state-mandated comprehensive plans (e.g., 
Heim 2005; Baker and Rodriguez 2009). Although a viable means to 
ensure tailoring to local needs, economics, and values, lack of integra-
tion with other levels of government decision making impedes efforts 
to address non-point source pollution. 
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As noted above, the primary sources of non-point source pollution 
are related to land use activities. EPA's Watershed Approach Framework 
recognizes the relation between non-point source pollution and land 
use and calls for a local, watershed-based approach to assure tailoring to 
both the characteristics of the local pollution problem and local social 
and economic needs (U.S. EPA 1996). However, the section on imple-
mentation includes nothing about the use of local land use planning 
and regulation as a tool, leaving implementation to voluntary measures 
(U.S. EPA 1996). 
Surprisingly, interpretation by courts of Fifth Amendment takings by 
restriction on land use to prevent take of critical habitat is not as limited 
as the interpretation applied to water rights, with the analyses appropri-
ately looking at the degree in reduction in value of the particular prop-
erty in question (Meltz 2009). However, it is the absence in coordination 
between ESA designations of critical habitat and local land use planning 
that is a greater hindrance. Development in the floodplain has substan-
tial impact on temperature, sediment load, and other factors that affect 
aquatic species (NWF v. FEMA 2004; National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice Northwest Region 2008; Williams 2011). Yet there appears to be no 
requirement for coordination between local floodplain ordinances and 
efforts to meet water quality standards. 
The relation between land use zoning and water allocation is also 
problematic. Many states have comprehensive approaches for water 
allocation and management. The lower courts in at least one state 
have struck down local attempts to use land use zoning to protect 
water quality and supply as preempted by state law (e.g., Ralph Naylor 
Farms, LLC v. Latah County 2006; Eagle Creek Partners, LLC v. Blaine 
County 2008). 
This description of the fragmentation of water management illus-
trates the difficulty of implementing a flexible approach. Authority 
divided among multiple federal, state, and local entities to use greater 
flexibility without robust coordination could create havoc. Yet our polit-
ical system, the recognition of property rights to water, and investment 
dependent on the current regulatory approach prevent wholesale imple-
mentation of a new approach. In this chapter, we will look at changes to 
improve flexibility and integration within the framework of the existing 
system. The next major section turns to resilience theory and network 
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analysis to inform these changes, but first we consider the added com-
plexity of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty 
The problems raised by fragmentation of water quality regulation, species 
management, water allocation, and land use planning are compounded 
by uncertainty in both the characterization of aquatic health and the 
ecological and social consequences of particular actions. The problem 
of uncertainty extends to each of the areas of regulation addressed, but 
will be discussed here in the context of water quality. 
The process of characterizing the water quality of every water body 
within a state involves an enormous undertaking and is fraught with 
uncertainty (Shabman et al. 2007). Added to the uncertainty of char-
acterizing the water quality of a water body is the uncertainty associ-
ated with characterizing the sources of non-point source pollutants. As 
noted by Houck (2002): 
The Achilles' heel of water quality standards-based regulation has 
always been the difficulty of ascribing and quantifying environmental 
effects for particular discharge sources. There is always another pos-
sible source, or another possible reason ... [a]nd when we come to 
more complex biological impacts such as the fate and effects of nutri-
ents, particularly those effects hundred~ of miles downstream, we are 
beyond any pretense of precise mathematics for cause and effect deci-
sions. The question is whether we are also, for these same reasons, 
beyond the reach oflaw. (58) 
Houck concludes that with the CW A requirement for a margin of 
safety in any TMDL order, we should not be "beyond the reach of the 
law;' because the margin can account for the degree of uncertainty. The 
question we seek to explore in this chapter is not the legal requirement 
but the practical question of how best to proceed in the face of uncer-
tainty. Recognizing that it is not enough simply to have the authority to 
act, we seek positive results. 
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Two related theories inform the discussion of how to address frag-
mentation and uncertainty: network and resilience theory. The following 
sections describe how these theories inform solutions to the problem 
followed by specific application to water management and regulation. 
Network Theory: Integration across Multiple 
Entities and Jurisdictions 
The study of resilience in social-ecological systems has led to the devel-
opment of the concept of the adaptive cycle to describe the state and evo-
lution of a self-organizing system and panarchy theory to describe the 
overlapping and multiscalar structure of adaptive cycles linked across 
scales (Holling 2001; Gunderson and Holling 2002). The adaptive cycle 
consists of: (1) a growth phase leading to; (2) increasing conservation, 
which at some point may become sufficiently rigid that a small pertur-
bation leads to; (3) collapse or "release;' a chaotic phase resulting in; (4) 
reorganization and innovation in a context in which the cost of failure is 
low. Some innovation will succeed, leading back to (1) growth (Holling 
2001). The idea that management for resilience could mean allowing 
collapse of a system does not instill faith in the approach by those who 
recognize stability as one of the key factors in an economic system. But 
panarchy recognizes that adaptive cycles occur at many scales and feed-
back occurs across scales. Higher, slower cycles may provide stability for 
smaller scales to engage in innovation and adaptation while minimizing 
the risk of collapse (Holling 2001; Gunderson and Holling 2002). Inno-
V'ation and adaptation at smaller scales can feed back to the maintenance 
)f stability at larger scales. Viewed from the perspective of the U.S. sys-
:em, stable federal and state law can provide room for local innovation. 
Sxperimentation at the scale of a watershed does not involve the degree 
)f risk or political aversion present if experimentation was undertaken 
It the scale of a river basin. For example, local changes in tillage practice 
allowed by monitoring of both pollutant results and economic viability 
:an, if successful, provide information to facilitate adoption elsewhere. 
vioving from structural to nonstructural flood control (Le. reconnect-
ng the river to the floodplain) can have both water quality and habitat 
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benefits, yet could be highly risky if undertaken on a large scale without 
substantial data on the resulting flood control benefits. Nested scales of 
management authority thus allow for local adaptation while providing 
large scale stability. 
Furthermore, the concept of panarchy cautions that there will be link-
age among the results of actions at different scales whether or not strict 
legal lines are drawn between authorities and jurisdictions. Thus, a local 
land use decision to build in a river floodplain may lead to increased 
need for investment in storage across an international boundary. If the 
ecological system will not allow us to ignore the linkage among scales, 
then it is advisable to approach the linkages among agencies and juris-
dictions deliberately and build them to facilitate adaptation. 
Analogous to the concept of nested scales in ecological systems, inte-
gration of water resource management requires moving from a focus on 
efficiency and clean lines between jurisdictional authorities, to a focus 
on diversity, redundancy, and multiple levels of management, including 
a role for local knowledge and local action. The adaptive state of systems 
at scales above and below the scale of a system of interest may enhance 
or detract from the resilience of the system of interest (Walker et al. 
2004; Walker and Salt 2006). 
In applying this concept to a river basin, while coordination may be 
needed across the entire basin, issues that arise do not always require 
action at such a large scale. Designation of an entity with authority at 
the scale of the particular ecological sy~tem can serve as the mecha-
nism for coordination at that scale, but it is not a replacement for 
diversity in governance at multiple scales (Huitema et al. 2009). Schol-
ars recognize that a scale appropriate for one problem may not be 
relevant for another (Ruhl and Salzman 2010). In addition, complex 
systems do not always have clearly identifiable scales for governance 
(Ruhl and Salzman 2010). In contrast to the difficult search for the 
appropriate match in scale, resilience thinking rejects the call for a 
single, efficient level of management and instead calls for multiple 
overlapping authorities. At the same time, coordination across scales 
is necessary. As noted by Lee (1993) in reference to the Columbia 
River Basin: Each of the major uses of the basin's resources is man-
aged by a different constellation of human institutions, each set of 
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managers guards its rights and prerogatives, and none is sufficiently 
powerful to bring the others to heel. Multiple management of mul-
tiple uses produces a tragedy of the commons. (28) 
Instead, a networked approach informed by resilience allows response 
at different scales across different entities depending on the source and 
impacts of the problem. Importantly, it leads to consideration of minor 
changes to the existing diverse system, rather than an entirely new 
approach. 
Complicating the scale issue even more are situations in which the 
source of the problem and the negative impact occur at different scales, 
thus removing any incentive for action at the scale of the problem source 
(Long 2010). This situation highlights the need for response capacity at 
multiple, linked scales. In the United States, we have seen the results 
of this mismatch in the form of backlash to some of the environmen-
tal laws passed in the 1970s. For example, the failure of states to take 
action led to federal regulation to achieve clean water, (Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (CWA §§ 1251-1387), clean air (Clean Air Act of 
1963 [CAA]), and species protection (ESA). Yet although the scale of the 
problem is federal, the source may be local land use planning in the case 
of non-point source pollution (Adler et al. 1993), or local development 
of wetlands important to filtration of polluted water and flood mitiga-
tion on a larger scale (Rapanos v. United States 2006; Cosens 2008), or 
local development that will endanger an obscure species important to 
biodiversity in general (National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt 
1997). Problems such as non-point source pollution that result from 
the cumulative effect of many small activities, some located far from 
the point at which the cumulative effect begins to violate water quality 
standards, require both local capacity to act and enhanced monitoring 
to tie source to impact. 
All too frequen~ly, those of us in the academy propose governance 
changes based on the ideal end point we seek to achieve without regard 
to where we are now. The resistance to change and slow incremental 
process with which it occurs in a democratic system, coupled with the 
fact that the slow pace ensures deliberation and consideration of equity 
and justice, is possibly what led to Winston Churchill's famous quote 
that "democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the 
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rest that have been tried:' Rather than propose an entirely new form of 
nested levels of governance, this article seeks to make use of the exist-
ing diversity and multiple scales of water governance while developing 
means to integrate across and within various scales. In doing so, we 
propose process changes coupled with more minor changes to substan-
tive law. 
Substantive laws govern what is managed, who is regulated, and the 
goal of that management or regulation. Administrative law governs how 
these functions are implemented (Stewart 2003). The term "administra-
tive law" is used in this article to refer to any law governing the process 
of agency or governing body decision making. For example, administra-
tive law is used here in reference to U.S. domestic law to include not 
only the Administrative Procedure Act, but procedural requirements in 
substantive law, such as the requirement for development of an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement in the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1970 (NEPA §§ 4321 et seq.) or the requirement of consultation in the 
ESA (§§ 1531 et seq.). 
Three changes that will not disrupt the existing legal system that 
establishes and allocates authority among institutions are needed to 
facilitate adaptable response at multiple scales: (1) enhanced monitor-
ing; (2) increased local capacity; and (3) vertical and horizontal net-
works across jurisdictions and scales to allow coordinated response 
among overlapping authorities without high transaction costs. Because . 
enhanced monitoring is also a major factor in addressing uncertainty, it 
will be discussed below. The following P?ragraphs explore the use of net-
works to allow flexibility in the scale of response, multiscalar response, 
and enhanced flow of resources to the local level. 
The need for local capacity with robust networks to multiple levels 
can be seen more clearly if the example used is a sudden, high-risk situa-
tion. It is on the local level, not the level of an entity like the U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, that a major portion of the resources are 
needed for response to events like Hurricane Katrina or 9/11. Yet with-
out the link to assistance both from other communities and from state, 
national, and international levels, a disaster of such magnitude will be 
beyond the capacity of any local government. 
In addition, studies of postdisaster short and long-term relief indi-
cate that networks for coordination and clear definition of roles must be 
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addressed prior to a disaster if local organizations are to be effectively 
used in providing relief (Stys 2011). Taking the example of emergency 
response further, a proven and highly robust system for multiagency / 
jurisdiction networking is presented to the general public on national 
news on an annual, if not more frequent, basis. The example is the 
incident command system for multijurisdictional response to a large-
scale, often mass casualty, emergency. The incident command system 
is a highly robust process for multientity response to an emergency, in 
which the scale and timing was highly uncertain prior to its occurrence 
(e.g., see U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Forest Service 
2000). Rather than create a new agency at the scale of every conceivable 
emergency, the incident command system provides a means for rapid 
crisis response across multiple agencies at the same level and through 
multiple levels of agencies. 
The incident command system works on the theory that rapid coordi-
nation requires that no more than seven people report to anyone person. 
The incident commander is at the top level of response and is selected 
based on the nature and location of the emergency. No more than seven 
people or entities report to the incident commander, no more than seven 
to each of those seven, and so on, until the on-the-ground response to, 
for example, a wildfire, a flood, or an earthquake may involve hundreds 
or even thousands of people. In one author's (Cosens) experience as a 
search and rescue volunteer, the initial hours or even days of response to 
a large-scale emergency are often chaotic, as response personnel move 
into position, assess the scope of the problem, and identify the chain of 
command. However, within a remarkably short period of time, given the 
level of uncertainty involved, a relatively smooth operation emerges in 
which information and coordination of decisions in response to changes 
in the problem flow rapidly within and between levels. Although referred 
to by some as a "command and control" approach (Stys 2011), the inci-
dent command system is highly adaptive to meet the type, location, and 
scale of a disaster. The result is a clear line of hierarchical authority lead-
ing to the "command and control" description. This hierarchical approach 
fits the emergency nature of the situation, but it is the ease of formation 
of networks for flow of information and resources made possible by the 
conscious focus on flexible cross-entity and cross-scale coordination that 
serves as a lesson for water management. 
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Other than a flood, earthquake, landslide, wildfire, or volcanic erup-
tion, the types of change and uncertainty in a river basin do not occur 
on the timescale of an emergency. Fortunately, examples of establish-
ment of networks for management of slower processes also exist. Efforts 
to coordinate across different levels and authorities are reflected in the 
move toward integrated water resource management (Global Water 
Partnership 2000, 2002; European Union Council Directive 2000). A 
formal structure for integrated water resource management does not 
currently exist in the United States. Ruhl and Salzman describe a pro-
cess in the Mississippi River Basin and Gulf of Mexico in which "weak 
ties" are formed among individuals working at various levels of govern-
ment and nongovernmental organizations as a solution to the scale of 
response needed for a water quality issue in which the pollution sources 
are diffuse and basin-wide (Ruhl and Salzman 2010). 
Effective networks rely on two primary components: (1) the existence 
of certain social skills among people within the network; and (2) facilita-
tion of, and removal of barriers to, cross-agency and cross-scale inter-
action. In their work on adaptive governance, Folke et al. (2005) note 
that success in managing ecological systems for resilience often depends 
on the involvement of key personality types such as mavens ("altruistic 
individuals, with social skills, who serve as information brokers, shar-
ing and trading what they know"), connectors ("individuals who know 
lots of people not only by numbers but the kind of people they know 
and in particular the diversity of acquaintances"), and entrepreneurial 
leaders (creative decision makers williI}g to risk being the first to try 
something). This is consistent with author Cosens's observation of mul-
tijurisdictional water negotiations, in which success is often determined 
by key personalities involved (Cosens 1998). 
Administrative law and institutional structure cannot mandate the 
individuals involved, but could be designed to maximize diversity, thus 
increasing the likelihood that these personality types are represented. In 
addition, organizational structures may be set up to provide positions 
and incentives for people who play the roles of maven, connector, and 
entrepreneurial leader within governmental entities. Clearly, there is 
also a role for our institutions of higher education in educating students 
with the skills necessary to bring people together and to communicate 
across boundaries. 
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That certain types of people are needed to form transjurisdictional 
networks is not a satisfying answer in itself. Any solution formalized in 
an administrative process must strike a balance between facilitation of 
network formation and avoidance of a rigid structure that cannot adapt 
to changing scale and type of problem. We can take lessons from expe-
rience with systems like the incident command system for emergency 
response to improve the capacity of networks to form and act adaptively 
and to facilitate that improvement by incorporating the following ele-
ments into administrative law and resource allocation. 
First, coordination and communication among different entities 
works better if its requirement is explicit (Bingham 2009). Thus, it must 
be a written legal requirement that is assigned to a specific position 
created within each entity without imposing rigid requirements on the 
position. Establishment of a network framework upfront can also avoid 
transaction costs encountered with the ad hoc development of a net-
work after a problem is identified (Huitema et al. 2009). 
Second, practice improves response. Under the incident command 
system, the operation appears to be much smoother in response to inci-
dents, such as wildfire, that occur somewhat predictably on an annual 
timescale, than it is in response to rare events, such as a hurricane or 
earthquake. In the context of river management, this could translate 
into frequent information sharing among entities as a building block 
in the relationships necessary for multijurisdictional decision making. 
Third, substantial resources must be devoted to the local level, since 
local actors are likely to be a component of response to any scale of prob-
lem. The current structure of resource availability, both with respect to 
funding and people, for entities that manage natural resources may need 
to be inverted, with greater resources made available at the local rather 
than at the national level. Once again, the flow of resources in response 
to an emergency serves as an illustration of the need. Few question 
the need for the largest number of people responding to a wildfire 
to be those on the ground. This same thinking should be imported to 
resource management in general. 
Fourth, harmonization of methods and regulations in the area of 
overlap will result in more effective networks (Zaring 2009). While 
noting the important role of social networks in environmental compli-
ance, Bodin and Crona (2009) note that not all networks are equal in 
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their effectiveness. By studying the topology of networks, their work 
has begun to identify key characteristics. Although intuitively we might 
consider a cohesive group to be more likely to achieve self-regulation, 
complex problems require a balance between cohesion and diversity of 
network membership to foster creative solutions, use of local knowl-
edge, and adaptive capacity. In addition, ties to external sources for 
knowledge and resources and to assure legitimacy are necessary. Thus, 
the current diversity in entities with water management authority on 
any particular river basin is actually an asset. Rather than remove the 
diversity already present, simply altering process through administra-
tive law to harmonize methods and regulations will enhance network 
response. 
Finally, attention must be paid to the difference between formal and 
informal networks. For effective management across multiple entities, 
networks with low transaction costs are needed (Huitema et al. 2009). 
One way to achieve this goal is to build network formation into the 
administrative process rather than leaving it to be formed on an ad hoc 
basis when a problem arises. Models for coordination across entities 
and scales imbedded in administrative law could greatly reduce these 
transaction costs. At the same time, caution is warranted in any attempt 
to formalize the interaction across entities and scales before under-
standing existing informal networks for communication and action. 
Research by Bodin and Crona (2009) suggests that informal networks 
appear to be more successful than an imposed structure. Informal net-
work formation can be facilitated throu,gh capacity building, identifica-
tion of influential actors through use of social network analysis prior to 
establishing lines of coordination, encouraging broad participation, and 
providing a forum for communication (Bodin and Crona 2009). It may 
be more important to remove legal barriers to network formation than 
to mandate a particular structure. 
Resilience Theory: Adaptation in the Face of Uncertainty 
As noted earlier, resilience as applied to ecological systems addresses 
a system's ability to respond to change while continuing to provide, or 
returning to a state in which it will provide, a full range of ecosystem 
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services or functions (Walker and Salt 2006). Resilience theory provides 
a framework for moving from management through optimization to a 
more adaptive form of management based on recognition of the com-
plexity of an ecological system and the associated uncertainty. 
To apply resilience theory to governance, it is also necessary to define 
the use of terms related to resource management. Much of the literature 
calls on adaptive management to achieve resilience (Lee 1999; Folke et 
al. 2005; Huitema et al. 2009). The term adaptive management has been 
used to describe a process of learning through monitoring ecosystem 
response to a particular action followed by incremental change in the 
action based on what is learned (Lee 1999; Folke et al. 2005; Huitema 
et al. 2009), and generally applies to management action by a single 
entity. Under adaptive management, the natural adaptive abilities of an 
ecosystem are emphasized and promoted over the active management, 
control, optimization, and resource exploitation of the system (Folke et 
al. 2005). Continual and artificial maintenance of an ecosystem within 
human-defined parameters is less desirable. Instead, natural disruptions 
to the ecosystem are allowed to take place. The ecosystem becomes 
more resilient through natural disruptions (Ruhl 2011). 
Adaptive implementation is a similar concept, but applies to the 
implementation of a regulatory statute such as the CW A rather than 
general management authority over a particular ecosystem (Shabman 
et al. 2007). Fostering the natural adaptive abilities of an ecosystem and 
providing a system of management or regulatory implementation that 
adapts to the results lessens the need to predict the full implications 
of a management or regulatory activity prior to taking action. Uncer-
tainty is accounted for in the incremental adjustment to change. Adap-
tive implementation will require three key components: (1) authority to 
make incremental adjustments to decisions based on monitoring, (2) 
monitoring, and (3) implementation at the smallest relevant scale with 
accompanying capacity building. Of course, overarching all of this is 
the need for "buy-in" from stakeholders, especially the regulated com-
munity. One component of achieving this may be to allow implementa-
tion measures to go either way as the result of monitoring-that is, to 
become more or less stringent depending on results. 
The current gap between the recognition by resilience scientists that 
adaptive management is an appropriate management tool in the face 
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of uncertainty and the achievement of practical adaptive management 
implementation arises from a failure to recognize and integrate the 
social component. It is not enough that monitoring and incremental 
adjustment will provide the best results in the face of uncertainty. The 
decisions on whether to use adaptive management, what to monitor, 
and how to make incremental adjustment must be done in a manner 
that will foster political acceptance. Thus, to achieve implementation of 
adaptive management requires attention to the process of governance 
used to carry it out. In this context, "governance [or adaptive governance 
in the context of implementation of adaptive management] is the pro-
cess of resolving trade-offs and of providing a vision and direction for 
sustainability, management is the operationalization of this vision .. :' 
(Boyle and Pond 2001, 122). By its definition, governance will involve 
trade-offs and thus may not lead to the perfect scientific result for the 
ecological system. But the flaw in implementing adaptive management 
without the integration of the social system is that it makes the same 
mistake as traditional management, by optimizing for a subset of the 
system-the ecosystem. Coupled with adaptive management, an appro-
priate form of governance addresses the entire social-ecological sys-
tem. This raises the question: What are the components of governance 
necessary to gain political acceptance for implementation of adaptive 
management? Cosens (2010, 2013) has developed a framework for 
legitimacy as a term to describe the necessary components in adaptive 
governance elsewhere and that work will be summarized and applied in 
the following paragraphs. . 
It is a basic tenet of political theory that people seek legitimacy in 
the actions of those who govern them (Bodansky 1999). Legitimacy can 
be thought of in simple terms as a measure of how persuasive the basis 
for a particular action is (Bodansky 1999). Legitimacy includes the jus-
tification for assertion of authority and has both popular and normative 
aspects (Bodansky 1999). Thus, an assertion of authority must be both 
justified (normative) and perceived to be justified (popular) to be legiti-
mate (Bodansky 1999). 
Democracy therefore emerges as a system with a high level of legiti-
macy. Through the process of electing those who govern, people con-
sent to their leadership. In casting a vote, a person is reflecting his or 
her perception of who can best govern. But when democratic nations 
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move from implementation of the law by elected officials to delegation 
of authority to administrative agencies or appointed governing bodies, 
they dilute the direct connection between the elected official and the 
voters affected by regulation. As the administrative state has grown, 
administrative law governing the process by which agencies or appointed 
bodies take action has developed to fill this gap in direct accountabil-
ity. The direct accountability gap increases with the scale of governance 
(Esty 2006). Thus, local agencies may have a higher perception of legiti-
macy in a river basin than federal or international entities. As the scale 
is reduced to the local level, fewer formal protections are needed to 
assure accountability to the regulated public. The introduction of flex-
ibility to water resource management to allow adaptive management 
can challenge traditional sources of legitimacy, thus presenting a barrier 
to adoption of new approaches. To achieve acceptance of governance 
that implements adaptive management, administrative law becomes a 
tool for enhancing legitimacy. 
Daniel Esty (2006) outlines five sources of legitimacy applicable to 
administrative entities in addition to the democratic process, three of 
which will be addressed here: (1) results-based: legitimacy derived from 
the fact that decisions are based on objective expertise and the results 
can be determined to be good; (2) order-based: legitimacy based on the 
fact that rules are clear, stable, and publicly available; and (3) delibera-
tive: legitimacy based on the inclusion of a public dialogue in the pro-
cess of decision making. The following discussion will use these sources 
of legitimacy to discuss the components necessary for adaptive imple-
mentation. A more thorough discussion of legitimacy and its relation to 
management for resilience is the topic of articles by Cosens (2010, 2013) 
and will be relied upon here. 
(1) Results-based legitimacy reliant on an agency's scientific exper-
tise began in the United States with Gifford Pinchot's call for scientific, 
federal management of the forests and establishment of the National 
Forest Organic Act in 1897 (§§ 473-478, 479-482, 551, as amended in 
1905, 1911, 1925, 1962, 1964, 1968 and 1976). The infusion of science 
into decision making has at its very core the belief that the process will 
be more objective and the results better. However, reliance on scientific 
expertise is increasingly questioned as a source of legitimacy, as agency 
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science shows vulnerability to politicization (Wagner 1995; Doremus 
and Tarlock 2005; Ruhl and Salzman 2006; O'Reilly 2007; Cosens 2008). 
Recent environmental and natural resources laws impose requirem~nts 
for use of "best available science" (e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974), 
as trust for objective science-based decision making without legally 
imposed criteria has eroded (Wagner 1995; Doremus and Tarlock 2005; 
Ruhl and Salzman 2006; O'Reilly 2007; Cosens 2008). However, it is not 
clear that such requirements are sufficient to address the growing politi-
cization of agency science in the United States. 
Adaptive implementation, if properly formulated, can actually pro-
vide a new approach to results-based legitimacy and stem the tide of 
politicized science (Camacho 2009). Adaptive implementation requires 
that the results of an agency action be monitored and that the action be 
adjusted based on the monitoring. Although substantial resources may 
be allocated to studying a problem in the process of developing a solu-
tion, data is rarely gathered to verify the results of a particular action, 
such as implementation of certain tillage practices to reduce sedimenta-
tion, ,once it is taken (Shabman et al. 2007; Camacho 2009). Furthermore, 
even if data were collected following agency action, agencies rarely have 
the authority to modify the action without going back through the rule-
making process or, in some cases, without new legislation. 
Reluctance to provide authority for flexible implementation lies, in 
part, in failure to characterize monitoring as an essential component of 
program implementation and failure to tie adjustment based on moni-
toring to agency accountability. By imp,osing a requirement that prog-
ress toward a particular goal, such as meeting water quality standards, 
must be accounted for and adjustment made in the face of new data, 
the use of science to achieve the goals of an interest group rather than 
the goal of a statute can be reduced. In this way, legitimacy is served by 
adaptive implementation. By placing funding for monitoring at the cen-
ter of measures to assure agency accountability rather than as an add-on 
study, legitimacy is served by adaptive implementation. 
(2) Order-based legitimacy captures the concepts of stability and 
finality, or at least predictive capability, regarding application of the 
law. It can be found in the move from administrative action on a case-
by-case basis to rule making. By promulgating rules to govern imple-
mentation of laws passed by Congress, agencies are more likely to apply 
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the law equally and uniformly to the regulated community. In addition, 
procedures governing rule making require notice and allow comment 
on proposed rules prior to finalization (Administrative Procedure Act 
of 1946), thus assuring public input and public notice on how a law 
will be implemented. In recent years, the move to negotiated rule mak-
ing combines aspects of order-based legitimacy and deliberative legiti-
macy; it will be discussed below as a recommended aspect of adaptive 
implementation. Increasing adaptive capacity while retaining the ben-
efits of the rule-making process requires inclusion of monitoring and 
adjustment within the rule itself. By maintaining a process of notice and 
comment, or negotiated rule making in the process of adjustment, legit-
imacy may still be served. However, a larger problem is the possibility of 
instability resulting from more flexible management of resources relied 
on for economic pursuits, such as hydropower, commercial fishing, and 
irrigation. 
The expectations that rules will be stable and that finality can be 
achieved may present the most significant barriers to authorization of 
the flexibility needed to implement adaptive implementation. The desire 
for finality lies at the core of the desire to use implementation of "best 
management practices" as a proxy for achieving water quality standards. 
The communication gap between those advocating adaptive implemen-
tation/management, and those seeking finality is fundamental to many 
legal battles concerning natural resources and the environment and can 
be characterized as a basic conflict between science and law. In simple 
terms, science is a search for the truth (a process), whereas litigation is 
a search for finality (resolution) (Cosens 2008). Scientific inquiry has no 
statute of limitations, no concept of res judicata. Scientific methodology 
is a process of disproving what was formerly thought to be true, of re-
investigating questions thought solved, of re-interpreting information 
in light of new discoveries. In contrast, civil litigation is designed to 
finalize a dispute, to provide a forum where, no matter how flawed the 
inquiry, a peaceful final resolution of a dispute can be achieved. Simi-
larly, the current process of rule making is designed to visit the issue 
once and then proceed under a final rule rather than to re-examine and 
adjust to the results of the rule's implementation. 
The finality of civil litigation serves those with economic interests 
in the resource by providing stability for investment, whereas science 
168 RES I LIE NeE AND W ATE R GO V ERN A NeE 
serves those concerned with sustaining the resource itself by continuing 
the search for the true impacts of human action on the ecological system. 
But a re-examination of what is actually happening in natural resources 
and environmental law suggests that, despite the goals of civil litigation, 
finality is not being achieved. The fact that one side (the environmental 
side) of these issues seeks equal treatment for goals not served by the 
civil litigation (a true understanding of human impacts on the environ-
ment) destabilizes the system. Once a court provides a final answer, the 
issues will be revisited with another legal theory. Once the judicial sys-
tem is exhausted, the issues will be revisited in the legislature. Once the 
political system is exhausted, the issues will be addressed through civil 
disobedience. Thus, while the process of civil litigation works well to 
help people resolve issues of liability for personal injury or for interpre-
tation of a contract, it may not be the best approach when the viability 
of an ecosystem and the economies dependent on it are at issue. It is this 
reality, that the current system is not providing what people seek, that 
encourages a more incremental and collaborative approach. 
Legitimacy in the incremental approach of adaptive implementa-
tion will require affording equitable treatment to both the economic 
need for finality and the progress toward the true system understand-
ing needed to address environmental concerns. Some current examples 
suggest that management relying on monitoring for adjustment uses a 
biological time frame when the management action is developed by a 
science-based agency (e.g., USGS Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, 
basing monitoring on biological goals) aI}d social time frames when the 
action is negotiated (e.g., Snake River Water Rights Settlement 2004, 
placing a thirty-year time frame on a biological opinion to provide sta-
bility for water users in the region). Yet to foster ecological resilience 
while maintaining legitimacy, both ecological and social time frames 
must be considered when setting the pace of incremental change. In 
addition, short-term human interests that tend to coincide with the 
elections cycle must not control the pace, yet must be factored in when 
seeking new approaches to management. 
(3) Deliberative legitimacy is reflected in the growing expectation and 
provision for public comment in numerous aspects of agency decision 
making, from the requirement of notice and comment in rule making 
to the increasing use of public meetings to gain support for a decision. 
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In the United States, the passage of the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) of 1969, can be considered the major turning point in pub-
lic involvement in agency decision making (Hirt and Sowards 2011). 
Unlike the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act that meet-
ings and records be open to the public (which is certainly an important 
aspect oflegitimacy), NEPA imposes the affirmative duty on agencies to 
develop, analyze, and provide to the public for comment, information 
on the environmental impact of major federal actions. (NEPA § 4332). 
Although NEPA does not impose any substantive requirement to choose 
the most environmentally sustainable alternative (Vermont Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. NRDC 1978), it arms the public with the information 
necessary to participate in shaping the decision through the political 
process. In that context, it is one factor in local capacity building. 
Adaptive implementation provides an excellent opportunity to 
employ some of the newer methods of public involvement (Bingham 
2009). It lends itself to use of a procedure similar to negotiated rule 
making, in which the agency collaborates with the regulated community 
and interested parties (e.g., a watershed committee) to develop a rule for 
reaching decisions on incremental changes in management. Small-scale 
(spatial and temporal) impacts may be reflected best in local knowl-
edge, thus a more collaborative process may improve the knowledge 
base for the decision. A more collaborative approach to management 
could also make use of the interagency networks discussed above in 
the context of response scale to allow coordination of adaptation and 
avoid unintended consequences of agency action. In addition, the net-
work approach may be necessary to allow for manageable public input 
on jurisdictionally complex water basins. 
While adaptive implementation in the face of uncertainty presents 
a theoretical approach to managing the uncertainty associated with 
understanding the water quality and sources of pollution to our water 
resources, without careful attention to the legitimacy of the decision 
making that imposes it (Le., adaptive governance), adaptive imple-
mentation will remain a theoretical approach. By assuring that deci-
sions involving the goals of water management and choices in making 
incremental change are based on and incorporate (1) adequate moni-
toring and scientific analysis (results-based legitimacy); (2) notice and 
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opportunity for input to decision making and management changes 
based on a time frame that takes both the biological and social needs 
into account (order-based legitimacy); and (3) capacity building and 
development of collaborative processes at the scale of the water system 
to be managed (deliberative legitimacy), adaptive implementation can 
move from theory to impact. 
Conclusion 
Despite almost forty years of management under the federal CW A, the 
goal of full-use attainment in the nation's aquatic systems remains elu-
sive. Fragmentation of authority among federal, tribal, state, and local 
jurisdictions, and uncertainty in both the characterization of water bod-
ies and responses to management actions to improve water quality are 
primary barriers to achieving and maintaining the full array of ecosys-
tem services possible from the nation's water bodies. Efforts to integrate 
water management and regulation must proceed against the very real 
backdrop of the existing fragmented system. Not only is it a purely aca-
demic exercise to contemplate design of governance and implementa-
tion of regulation starting from a clean slate, in seeking resilience in the 
social-ecological systems involved, modularity and functional redun-
dancy in authority is beneficial. Rather than ~ropose a new system, this 
chapter recommends integration through network formation. This will 
require (1) evaluation of existing inform'i\l networks among authorities, 
(2) removal of barriers to the smooth functioning' of networks, (3) provi-
sion of authority where existing networks are absent, and (4) assistance 
where necessary to build local capacity. 
Progress to reduce uncertainty and improve return on investment 
in efforts to restore healthy aquatic systems requires a reframing of the 
dialogue surrounding regulatory implementation and agency account-
ability. Resources spent on monitoring results must be viewed as a 
long-term investment by attaching a dollar value to information and 
providing the authority for adjustment of regulation as new information 
becomes available that changes our understanding of system behavior 
and as societal needs evolve. The short-term expenditure on collection 
of data will lead to efficiency in identification of appropriate measures 
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and will reduce the current politicization of agency science by assuring 
that constant progress toward statutory goals is achieved. It is a nec-
essary investment not only in our own future but as a legacy for our 
children. 
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